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Abstract 
The self-reference effect (SRE) has been shown to benefit episodic memory in healthy 
individuals. In healthy aging, its preservation is acknowledged, but in Alzheimer’s disease 
(AD), the jury is still out. Furthermore, there has yet to be a study of the SRE in amnesticmild 
cognitive impairment (aMCI). As self-reference implies subjective self-representations, and 
positive information enhance memory performance, weset out to examine the effects of 1) 
material and 2) identity valence on the SRE across the early stages of AD. Twenty healthy 
older individuals and 40 patients (20 diagnosed withaMCI and 20 diagnosedwith mild AD) 
performed a memory task. Participants had to judge positive and negative personality trait 
adjectiveswith reference to themselvesor to anotherperson, or elseprocess these adjectives 
semantically. We then administered a recognition task. Participants also completed a 
questionnaire on identity valence. Among healthy older individuals, the SRE benefited 
episodic memory independentlyof materialand identity valence. By contrast, among aMCI 
patients,we only observed the SRE when the material was positive. When self-referential 
material was negative, patients’performancedepended on the valence of their self-
representations: negative self-representations correlated with poor recognition of negative 
self-referentialadjectives. Finally, performance of patients with mild AD by condition and 
material valence were too low and inappropriate to be subjected to relevant analyses.The 
persistence of anSRE for positive adjectivesin aMCI suggests theexistence of a positivity 
effect for self-related information, which contributes to wellbeing. The absence of an SRE for 
negative adjectives,which led aMCI patients to dismiss negative self-related information, 
could be due to low self-esteem. These results corroborate the mnenic neglect model andpoint 
outthe importance of the psychoaffective dimension in patients with aMCI, which 
couldconstitute a major factor for the preservation of their self-esteem and self-
relatedmemory. 
Keywords: self-reference effect; positivity effect;episodic memory; amnesticmild cognitive 
impairment; Alzheimer’s disease 
  
1. Introduction 
The memory advantage conferred by self-referentialinformation has been of 
considerableinterest to psychologists for more than 40 years. In 1977, Rogers, Kuiper, and 
Kirkerreported that self-reference constitutes arich and powerful encoding process. In their 
groundbreakingself-reference effect (SRE) paradigm, young participants had to rate trait 
adjectives that ranged in depth of encoding from structural and phonemic tosemantic, and 
finally self-referential. This paradigm relied on the levels-of-processing framework for human 
memory devised by Craik and Lockhart (1972) and Craik and Tulving (1975). Briefly, 
experiments showed that the persistence of the episodic memory trace depended on the depth 
of analysis, with greater depth corresponding to a greater degree of semantic involvement 
from the participants. Deep encoding (semantic)would lead to betterepisodic memory 
performance than shallow encoding (structural or phonemic). Rogers et al. (1977) then 
demonstrated that a self-referential conditionwas leadingto deeper encoding than a semantic 
condition, as the subsequent memory task yielded better performance when individuals had 
referred the trait adjectives to themselves. 
Numerous studies conducted in healthy individualshave confirmed the 
considerablepotential effect of the SRE on recognition performance (seeSymons & Johnson, 
1997, for a review) and its robustness across the adult lifespan (Morel et al., 2014; Glisky & 
Marquine, 2009; Gutchess, Kensinger, Yoon, & Schacter, 2007;Mueller, Wonderlich, & 
Dugan, 1986). Furthermore, although healthyolderindividuals have difficulty retrieving 
specific details from the encoding context (see Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993, for a 
review),there is evidence that this episodic memory deficit in aging can be counteracted by 
self-reference during encoding (Dulas, Newsome, & Duarte, 2011; Hamami, Serbun, & 
Gutchess, 2011), which is thought to promote recollection-based processes.This process has 
been named the self-reference recollection effect(SRRE;Conway, Dewhurst, Pearson, & 
Sapute, 2001).  
The self may not be a unitary entity, but rather a multiplicity of interrelated processes 
and contents. According to Klein and Gangi (2010), episodic and semantic memory both 
contribute to the sense of self. One specific type of self-knowledge is semantic summary 
representations of one’s personality traits, which necessarily depend on how one perceives 
oneself (positively or negatively). Sense of identity through personality trait-knowledge 
hasinterestingly been shown to be peculiarly resilient in patients with Alzheimer’s disease 
(AD). Most of the time, these patients exhibit a preserved sense of identity (Eustache et al., 
2013; Klein, Cosmides, & Costabile, 2003; Rankin, Baldwin, Pace-Savitsky, Kramer, & 
Miller, 2005), along with a general positive view of themselves when compared with healthy 
older individuals (Eustache et al., 2013; Kalenzaga & Clarys, 2013; Lalanne, Rozenberg, 
Grolleau, & Piolino, 2013). It has been suggested that their inability to learn new information 
and update knowledge about their current self could explain why they continue to maintain a 
positive view of themselves, despite the disease (Lalanne et al., 2013; Naylor & Clare, 2008). 
To ourknowledge, no study hasyetinvestigated the sense of self in aMCI. Given that aMCI 
and AD could be seen as a continuum, we can speculate that the sense of identity in aMCI 
patients is relatively preserved as well. In particular, aMCI patients should display a relatively 
positive sense of identity when compared with healthy older individuals. 
Very few studies have investigated theadvantage ofself-referentialpersonality traits on 
episodic memoryperformance in AD.The literature is young, scarce, and thus divided. Some 
studies have compared recognition performance for self-referential adjectives (i.e., “Does the 
adjective describe you?”) and semantically processed adjectives (i.e, “Is the adjective 
positive?”), while others have compared recognition performance for self-referred and other-
referred (i.e., judgments of celebrities) adjectives. Usually, the SRE was evaluatedwitha 
simple yes/no recognition task yielding a recognition rate, while the SRRE was evaluated by 
means of the Remember/Know (R/K) paradigm, yielding a recollection rate. The R/K 
paradigmallows episodic memory to be assessed through autonoetic consciousness (Gardiner, 
1988; Tulving, 1985,2002). Remember (R) responses involve episodic memory: they reflect 
the recollection of contextual details that give onethe impression of traveling back in time and 
reliving past experiences. By contrast, know (K) responses are assumed to reflect a feeling of 
familiarity without recollection, via semantic memory processes. In Genon et al. study (2014), 
two encoding conditions were used (self-referential vs. other-referential). Their results 
revealed neither SRE, nor SRRE in AD patients. The absence of an SRE in patients with AD 
has also been observed with a memory task including a self-referential condition and a 
semantic condition (i.e., “does the adjective represent a socially desirable trait?”;Lalanne et 
al., 2013). By contrast, an SRE was found when patients with AD performed a memory task 
featuring a self-referential condition and an other-referential condition (Kalenzaga & Clarys, 
2013). The SRRE has also been found in patients with AD in studies focusing on the valence 
of the personality traits used for self-reference. In Lalanne et al. (2013), an SRRE was 
observed exclusively for positive words in a memory task that also featured a semantic 
encoding condition for the sake of comparison. By contrast, in Kalenzaga and Clarys (2013) 
and Kalenzaga, Bugaïska, and Clarys (2013), the SRRE was observed exclusively for 
negative words, regardless of the nature of the comparison condition (other-referential or 
semantic). 
These conflicting results maystem fromdifferences in methodology, such as the use of 
intentional (Genon et al., 2014; Kalenzaga&Clarys, 2013, Kalenzaga et al., 2013) versus 
incidental encoding conditions (Lalanne et al., 2013),or the length of the retention interval 
between the encoding and recognition/retrieval conditions, which can range from ten seconds 
(Genon et al., 2014) to one minute (Kalenzaga&Clarys, 2013, Kalenzaga et al., 2013) or even 
20 minutes (Lalanne et al., 2013). Anothermethodological difference that could have led to 
these contradictory results isthe setting of the memory task: either inside (Genon et al., 2014) 
or outside an MRI scanner (Kalenzaga&Clarys, 2013, Kalenzaga et al., 2013; Lalanne et al., 
2013). However, one result yielded by some of these studies is the poor overall memory 
performance displayed by patients with AD. For this reason, a study of the SRE among 
patients with less impaired cognitive functioning, but who are at risk for developing AD, 
would be particularly useful. In this respect, patients with amnestic mild cognitive impairment 
(aMCI) constitute appropriate candidates. 
Episodic memory impairment constitutes the inaugural and most long-lasting 
prevailing symptom in AD (see Salmon & Bondi, 2009, for review). However, cognitive 
impairments in AD start insidiously and evolve progressively. Patients therefore experience a 
transient phase during which cognitive deficits are detectable, but are not of sufficient severity 
to meet the criteria for dementia. This transient phasegave rise to the concept of MCI, first 
proposed by Flicker, Ferris, and Reisberg (1991) and then refined byPetersen et al. (1999). In 
front of the apparent heterogeneity among these patients, the definition has nowadays been 
refined to provide crucial diagnosis tools for clinical and research ends (Petersen et al., 2001;  
Petersen, 2003; Winblad et al., 2004; Gauthier et al., 2006).  Two subtypes of MCI patients 
are now distinguished: amnestic and non-amnestic. The amnesic subtype of MCI is 
considered as a syndrome in which episodic memory decline is greater than expected for an 
individual's age and education level but that does not impact on activities of daily living. 
Memory impairments are usually associated with a memory complaint expressed by the 
patient.It is one of the most potential prodromal, symptomatic but pre-dementia stages of AD 
(Petersen & Morris, 2005).Besides, the decline of episodic memory in aMCI patients has been 
observed with both verbal and visual tasks (Crowell, Luis, Vanderploeg, Schinka, & Mullan, 
2002; Petersen et al., 1999). Some studies suggest that episodic memory troubles in aMCI 
would be associated to a deficit in the consolidation of information that is similar to the one 
observed in AD (Crowell et al., 2002;Chételat et al., 2005; Perri, Carlesimo, Serra, & 
Caltagirone, 2005). aMCI patients alsoexperiencedifficulties to use strategies at the time of 
encoding and show impairmentduringretrieval. As such, patients with aMCI do less semantic 
clustering during learning (Ribeiro, Guerreiro, & De Mendonça, 2007) and show elevated 
intrusion errors during recall, as well as poor recognition performance with increased false 
positive (Greenaway et al., 2006). Finally, aMCI patients present reduced autonoetic 
consciousness, as measured using the R/K paradigm (Irish, Lawlor, O’Mara, & Coen, 2010; 
Rauchs et al., 2007). Altogether, these results suggest that aMCI patients show memory 
patterns very close to what can be observed in AD. 
With regard to the literature on emotion and valence, in healthy individuals, 
emotionally-laden materialhave been shown to enhance memory (seeNeisser & Libby, 2000 
andKensinger, 2004, for a review). Furthermore, healthy older adultshave a tendency to focus 
their attention on positive information (Mather & Carstensen, 2003; and seeMather & 
Carstensen, 2005, for a review). This attention bias for positive information is believed to 
improve memory (the so-called positivity effect), as the more information is attended, the 
more likely it is to be remembered later on(Carstensen, 2006). Regarding aMCI and 
AD,research on the impact of emotion and/or valence on memoryhas provided mixed results, 
reporting either an effect of emotion (Giffard, Laisney, Desgranges, & Eustache, 2015; ), no 
effect of emotion(Abrisqueta-Gomez, Bueno, Oliveira, & Bertolucci, 2002; Kensinger, 
Brierley, Medford, Growdon, & Corkin, 2002), an effect of positive valence(Kalenzaga, 
Piolino, & Clarys, 2014; Maki, Yoshida, Yamaguchi, & Yamaguchi, 2013; Werheid, 
McDonald, Simmons-Stern, Ally, & Budson, 2011; Werheid et al., 2010) or an effect of 
negative valence(Kalenzaga & Clarys, 2013; Kalenzaga et al., 2013; Döhnel et al., 
2008;Boller et al., 2002). The question of whether the effect of emotionally-laden material on 
memory is maintained through self-reference across the spectrum of ADpathology still 
requires much more investigation.  
In the present study, we first aimed to investigate the effect of material valence 
(personality trait adjectives) on changes in the SRE in patients with aMCI. Episodic memory 
is less impaired in patients with aMCI thanin patients with AD. We therefore reasoned that 
studyingthis prodromal stage might avoid poor episodic memory 
performance,whichcouldsometimes lead to conflicting resultsreported in the literature on the 
SRE in AD. The overall memory performance of patients with mild AD would be poorer than 
those of patients with aMCI and in a similar vein, the overall memory performance of patients 
with aMCI would be poorer than thoseof healthy older individuals. We predictedthat the SRE 
would be maintained in patients with aMCI and mild AD whencompared with healthy older 
individuals, but wouldvary in amplitude as a function of material valence. In the second part 
of our study, we examined whether the valence of identity influenced changes in self-related 
memory performance within each group, as the SRE necessarily relies on subjective self-
representations. We therefore studied the SRE in healthy older individualsand patients with 
aMCI and mild AD, by administering a memory task that featuredone self-referential 
encoding condition and two control encoding conditions (other-referential and semantic) 
andaccounting for the valence of the material used and the valence of identity. 
2. Material and Methods 
2.1. Participants 
A total of 60 right-handed native French-speaking participants were included in the 
study: 20 healthy controls (HC; 11 men; 9 women; mean age ± SD: 71.60 ± 5.25 years), 20 
patients with aMCI (9 men; 11 women; mean age ± SD: 74.15 ± 6.30 years) and 20 patients 
with mild AD (15 men; 5 women; mean age± SD: 69.10 ± 9.27 years). Ten of the 20 
patientswith mild AD had to be excluded from the analyses because their cognitive deficits 
were too severe (they did not understand the instructions for the memory task). We 
nonetheless reported a description of the neuropsychological screening obtained from the 
patients with mild AD that were excluded. Someof the participants included in the present 
study were previously involved in other publications (Perrotin et al., 2015; La Joie et al., 
2012; 2013; 2014).HC were recruited from the community on a voluntary basis and enrolled 
in the study after clinical and neuropsychological examinations. They were screened for 
abnormalities according to stringent inclusion/exclusion criteria, including (1) normal somatic 
examination; (2) no known vascular risk factor and smoking less than 10 cigarettes per day; 
(3) no alcohol or drug abuse; (4) normal standard T1- and T2-weighted magnetic resonance 
imaging (MRI) scans, as assessed by aphysician; (5) no clinical evidence of chronic 
neurological, psychiatric, hepatic, infectious or endocrine diseases (except for hypothyroid or 
stable diabetes); (6) no past history of severe disease; and (7) no current use of medication 
(except for estrogen replacement therapy and antihypertensive drugs). All HC had 
performanceswithin the normal range (i.e., within 1.65 SD of the normal mean for age) in all 
neuropsychological screening tests, which included cognitive tasks assessing verbal and 
visual episodic memory (RL/RI-16,Van der Linden & Juillerat, 2004; ESR, Eustache, 
Desgranges, & Lalevée, 1998; and BEM-144 figure recall, Signoret, 1991), and scales 
assessing overall cognitive functioning (Mini Mental State Examination, MMSE;Folstein, 
Folstein, & McHugh, 1975; Mattis Dementia Rating scale, MDRS;Mattis, 1976) and 
depressivesymptoms (Montgomery and Åsberg Depression Rating Scale, 
MADRS;Montgomery &Åsberg, 1979). Finally, none expressed any complaints about their 
memory. 
The patients with aMCI and AD were recruited from local memory centers,and were 
enrolled in the study according to the same stringent inclusion/exclusion criteria as HC 
(excepting criteria 4) and 5)), plus an eighth criterion: no current anticholinesterase and/or 
memantinetreatment. The patients with AD were diagnosed using NINCDS–ADRDA criteria 
for probable AD (McKhann et al., 1984), and were at the mild stage of the disease (MMSE 
between 19 and 24, Feldman & Woodward, 2005).They underwent the same 
neuropsychological tests as HC. Overall cognitive functioning was assessedwith the MMSE 
and MDRS, and depressivesymptoms were investigated with the MADRS. Data from other 
neuropsychological screening tests (RL-RI 16, ESR,BEM-144 figure recall) were sometimes 
missing.Patients withaMCI were diagnosed according to the criteria defined byPetersen and 
Morris (2005). These included the presence of a memory complaint, objective episodic 
memory deficits but preservation of other cognitive functions,autonomy in daily life, and 
absence of dementia.  
The study was approved by the regional ethics committee (CPP Nord-Ouest III), 
carried out in line with the Declaration of Helsinki, and registered at ClinicalTrials.gov (no. 
NCT01638949). All participants (and a close relative for the patients with AD) gave their 
written informed consent to the study prior to the investigation.  
2.2. Memory task 
The memory task,anadaptation of ones used in previous studies (Johnson et al., 2007; 
Kelley et al., 2002; Moran, Heatherton, & Kelley, 2009),hadpreviouslybeen validated in 
ourlaboratory in healthyyoungparticipants(Morel et al., 2014). It included a self-referential 
condition administered in an MRI scanner.The neuroimaging data are not reported in this 
publication. 
The memory task consisted ofan incidental encoding session immediately followed by 
a yes/no recognition session. The encoding and recognition sessions were each divided in two 
parts,of similar design. The sessions were block-designed to allow for a break and reduce 
participantfatigue.  
In each session (encoding/recognition), adjectives weredisplayed on a screen for 3500 
ms, along with brief instructions as to the nature of the task to be performed, followed by a 
fixation cross for 1000-3000 ms (mean: 2000 ms) (see Fig. 1). Items were displayed using E-
Prime software (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA, USA) implemented within IFIS 
System Manager (Invivo, Orlando, FL, USA). 
The encoding session was divided into three nested conditions, each corresponding to 
a specific type of judgment. For each personality trait adjective, participants were asked to 
perform one of three types of judgment: 1) self-related (“Does this adjective describe you?”), 
2) distant other-related (“Does this adjective describe Jacques Chirac?” – French president 
from 1995 to 2007 or “Does this adjective describe Johnny Hallyday?” – French singer), or 3) 
semantic (“Is this a positive adjective?”). Each part lasted about 7 minutes and contained 72 
adjectives, with the same proportions of positive and negative ones (12 positive self, 12 
negative self, 12 positive other, 12 negative other, 12 positive semantic, 12 negative 
semantic). 
In the recognition task, participants had to determine whether or not they had 
encountered theadjective displayed on the screen during the previous encoding session 
(“Old?”). Each retrieval session lasted around 8 minutes and included 84 adjectives (30 new 
distractoradjectives, 18 old self, 18 old other, and 18 old semantic, with the same number of 
positive and negative items in each category). 
The SRE was estimated on accuracy scores (proportion of hits minus proportion of 
false alarms),comparing memory performances for 1) self- versusdistant other-referred 
adjectives and 2) self-referred versus semantically processed adjectives. As such, the 
distantother and semantic conditions served ascontrolconditions. 
A pre-experimental training session was performed 15 minutes before the encoding 
session, to familiarize the participants with the task. The adjectives presented during this 
training session were different from those presented during the encoding session. 
The material consisted of 204 personality trait adjectives selected from 463 adjectives 
drawn from a French language dictionary (http://atilf.atilf.fr/). Their selection was based on 
familiarity and valence ratings provided in a pre-experiment by young and older individuals 
with low and high levels of education. The 204 selected adjectives were divided into sixlists 
of 24 adjectives(one list for each condition),and two lists of 30 adjectives to serve as 
distractors in the retrieval session. The adjectives in these eight lists were counterbalanced for 
familiarity, valence, and number of letters, so that these parameters did not differ between 
conditions. The lists were also counterbalanced across participants. 
 
Fig. 1. Illustration of the memory task.The incidental encoding phasewas divided into two 
parts, each lasting roughly7 minutes, during which participants had to determine whether the 
adjective displayeddescribed them(self-referential condition) or a celebrity (other-referential 
condition), or whether it was a positive adjective or not (semantic condition). Adjectives 
weredisplayed on a screen one at a time for 3500 ms, followed by a fixation cross 
for1000-3000 ms.Participants answered“Yes” or “No” with their right and left index fingers 
(counterbalanced across participants) using keypads. They were reminded of which side 
corresponded to which answer at the bottom of the screen. The recognition phase came 
immediatelyafter the incidental encoding session. Previously encountered adjectives (old 
ones) were mixed with distractors (new ones). Presentation of the adjectiveswas similar to 
that of the previous session (adjectives were presented on a screen one at a time for 3500 
ms).Participants had to decide whether or not they had already seen each adjective during the 
incidental encoding session. 
2.3. Identity valence questionnaire 
All participants were asked to complete a questionnaire on identity valence.The 
questionnaire was always completed a few days after the memory task, as it involved referring 
to personality trait adjectives and it could have led to interference, for which aMCI and AD 
patients are particularly sensitive to.  
This questionnairewas inspired by the second edition of the Tennessee Self-Concept 
Scale (TSCS2; Fitts&Waren, 1996), the Questionnaire of Self-Representation (QSR; Duval et 
al., 2012), the revised version of the Self-Consciousness Scale(SCS-R; Scheier & Carver, 
1985),and the Self-Concept Clarity Scale (Campbell et al., 1996),and is suitable for patients 
with dementia. The questionnaire is mainly based on the TSCS2, which measures three 
components of the self-concept (identity, behavior, and self-satisfaction) in five different self-
concept domains (moral-ethical, social, personal, physical, and family). A further four self-
concept domains are involved: two from the QSR (cognition and emotion), one from the SCS-
R (private self-consciousness), and one from the SCCS (flexibility/stability), resulting in nine 
self-concept domains. Respondents have torate50 self-descriptive statements:30 correspond to 
the five self-concept domains of the TSCS2, 12 to the two domains of the QSR, four to the 
domain of the SCS-R, and fourto the domain of the SCCS.  
All the self-descriptive statements are affirmative, but 24 are positive (e.g., “I am a 
friendly, likeable person”) and 26are negative (e.g., “I lack self-confidence”). Participants 
haveto determine whether or not each statement describesthem. The total score (identity 
valence score, /50) reflectsparticipants’ overall sense of identity and associated level of self-
esteem. A high score indicatesthat participants tend to hold a generally positive self-view, 
whereas a low score indicatesthat participants tend to hold a generally negative self-view. 
An abridgedversion of this questionnaire had already been administered topatientswith 
AD in more severe stages of dementia(Eustache et al., 2013). 
2.4. Statistical analyses 
We ran one-way analyses of variance (ANOVAs), with Group as between-participants 
factor, on demographic and clinical characteristics, and a chi-square test on sex distribution. 
Non parametric analyses (Mann-Whitney U tests) were performed on demographic 
and clinical characteristics to compare the two groups of patients with mild AD(the group that 
was able to perform the self-referential memory task and the one that was unable to perform 
it). 
For the memory task, the total rates of hits and false alarmswere first calculated by 
group and then by group and valence, so as to assess participants’ overall performance. 
Accuracy scores (proportion of hits minus proportion of false alarms) were then calculated by 
group, condition and valence, resulting in the following six scores: self negative accuracy, self 
positive accuracy, other negative accuracy, other positive accuracy, semantic negative 
accuracy and semantic positive accuracy. 
Overall memoryscores were submitted to a Group (HC vs. aMCIvs. AD) xValence 
(positive vs. negative) analysis of covariance (ANCOVA),with the MADRS score as a 
covariate. 
Owing to floor effects, the accuracy scores of the patients with AD by condition and 
valence were not included in subsequent analyses. 
Accuracy scores were analyzed with a Group (HC vs. aMCI) x Condition (Self vs. 
Other and Self vs. Semantic) x Valence (positive vs. negative) ANCOVA, with the MADRS 
score as a covariate. ANOVAs and ANCOVAs were followed by posthoc analyses (Tukey’s 
HSD test) whereappropriate. 
Identity valence z-scores were computed in aMCI patients on the basis of the data of 
the HC, such that negative z-scores reflected relatively negative identity valence while 
positive z-scores reflected relatively positive identity valence. These scores were subjected to 
one-sample t-tests with 0 as a reference value. 
Partial correlation coefficients betweenidentity valencez-scoresand the self 
accuracyscores (positive/negative) were then calculated for patients with aMCI, using 
MADRS as a continued predictor.Finally, in the aMCI group,we looked for significant 
correlations between the self accuracy scores (positive/negative) and the MMSE, MDRS,and 
MADRS. 
All the statistical analyses were performed using STATISTICA software (StatSoft®, 




3.1. Demographic and clinical characteristics 
Table 1 illustrates the demographic and clinical characteristics of theparticipants and 
of the group of patients with mild AD that was unable to perform the self-referential memory 
task. 
Regarding the participants, all three groups had similar sex distributions,χ2(2) = .72, p 
= .70, and did not differ on age,F(2,47) = 2.05, p = .14, η2p = .08, or years ofeducation,F(2,47) 
= 1.40, p = .26, η2p = .07.Between-group comparisons revealed similar sex distributionsThe 
analyses of MMSE scores revealed a main effect of Group,F(2,47) = 38.70, p< .001, η2p = .62. 
Posthoc analyses showedthat both patient groups had lower scores than HC (ps< .001), and 
patients with mild AD scored lower than patients with aMCI (p< .001). In the same vein, 
there was a main effect of Group for MDRS scores,F(2,47) = 45.45, p< .001, η2p = .66, with 
both patient groups scoring lower than HC (ps< .001), and patients with mild AD scoring 
lower than aMCIpatients (p< .001).The analysesof MADRS scores indicated a main effect of 
Group F(2,47) = 8.84, p< .001, η2p = .27. Patients withmildAD scored higher (reflecting 
greater depressive symptoms) on the MADRS than patients with aMCI (p< .05) and HC (p< 
.001), but there was no statistical significance between patients with aMCI and HC (p> 
.10).Regarding thecomparison of AD patients able and unable to perform the self-referential 
memory task, the analyses revealed that both groups had similar sex distribution, age and 





 Table 1. 
Demographic and clinical characteristics of the participants and the patients with mild      
AD unable to perform the self-referential memory task. 
 HC aMCI AD AD not 
investigated for 
SRE 
n (M/F) 11/9 9/11 6/4 6/4 
Age (years) 71.60 (5.25) 74.15 (6.30) 69.10 (9.27) 71.80 (12.86) 














 (10.27) 118.10 (10.77) 
MADRS score
 
0.45 (1.00) 1.60 (1.93)  3.60
c
 (3.10) 4.50 (3.06)  
Note.Values are means (standard deviations). HC = healthy controls; aMCI = amnestic mild 
cognitive impairment; AD = Alzheimer’s disease;n= sample size; M = male; F = female; 
MMSE = Mini Mental State Examination; MDRS = Mattis Dementia Rating Scale; MADRS 
= Montgomery and Åsberg Depression Rating Scale. Posthoc tests (see Results section3.1) 
indicated a significant difference between a) HC and patients (aMCI and ADable to perform 
the self-referential memory task), b) patients with aMCI and ADable to perform the self-
referential memory taskand c) HC and patients with ADable to perform the self-referential 
memory task. 
3.2.Overall performance on the memory task 
During encoding, the rates of total responses were almost 100% (99.9 ± .4) for HC, 
96% (± 14) for patients with aMCI and 95% (± 6) for patients with mild AD. During 
recognition, those rates were 100% (± .2) for HC, 99 % (± 1.6) for patients with aMCI and 96 
% (± 4.5) for patients with mild AD. Besides, total mean response latencies during incidental 
encoding were 2000 (±317)ms in the HC group, 2308 (±278)ms in the aMCI group and 2404 
(±144)ms in the AD group. 
Table 2 sets out the overall performances of the participants on the memory task (i.e., 
proportions of hits and false alarms) first as a function of group, then as a function of group 
and adjective valence. Regarding total hit rates, the analysis revealed a main effect of Group 
F(2,46) = 5.21, p< .009, η2p = .18.Posthocanalyses indicated a significant difference between 
HC and patients withaMCI (HC had higher total hit rates than patients with aMCI, p< .05), 
but neither between patients with aMCI and mild AD (p = .72)nor, paradoxically, between 
HC and patients with mildAD (p = .26).The patients with mild AD tended to answer “yes” 
most of the time, resulting in apparently preserved recognition. Regarding total false alarm 
rates, there was no main effect of Group F(2,46) = .73, p = .50, η2p = .03.  
The analysis of total hit rates as a function of Group and Valence showed a main effect 
of Group F(2,46) = 5.21, p< .009, η2p = .18, a main effect of Valence F(1,46) = 41.01, p< 
.001, η2p = .47, and a significant interaction between Group and Valence F(2,46) = 6.45, p< 
.003, η2p = .22. Both patient groups had higher hit rates for positive adjectives than for 
negative ones (ps< .001), whereas in the HC group, there was no difference in hit rates 
betweenvalences (p = .13). In addition, the proportion of hit rates for negative adjectives was 
significantly lower in both patient groups(aMCI and mild AD) compared with HC (ps< .005), 
whereas the proportion of hit rates for positive adjectives did not differbetween the three 
groups (ps> .84). Analysis of total false alarm rates as a function of Group and Valence 
showed no effect of GroupF(2,46) = .75, p = .48, η2p= .03, but there was a main effect of 
Valence F(1,46) = 44.13, p < .001, η2p= .49, and a significant Groupx Valence interaction 
effect,F(2,46) = 3.37, p < .05, η2p = .13. The patients with mild AD producedsignificantly 
more false alarms for positive distractors than HC (p< .002),but not the patients with aMCI (p 
= .48). Within the groups, there were more false alarms for positive than for negative 
distractors (HC,p < .01; patients with aMCI and AD, ps< .001).  
In the following section, we set out the accuracy scores, which we calculated by 
subtracting false alarms from total hits. The accuracy scores by condition and valence of the 
patients with mild AD were extremely low, sometimes resulting in a floor effect. For this 
reason, the patients with mildAD were excluded from subsequent analyses. Nonetheless, to go 
deeper into the analyses of the AD group, we examined individuals’ profile of SRE in the 10 
patients that had performed the task. Individuals’ SRE above 5% were considered as a 
significant benefit for self-referential information.  For positive adjectives, seven(SRE 
rangingfrom 5 to 33%) and five (SRE ranging from 5 to 11%) patients showed a significant 
benefit in the self-referential condition compared respectively to the semantic and the other 
ones, while for negative adjectives, only two and three patients showed a significant SRE. In 
addition, for the negative adjectives, six and seven patients showed negatives effects, i.e. a 
significant difference with lower performances in the self-referential condition compared to 







Overall performance of HC, patients with aMCI and mild AD on the memory task. 
Total HC aMCI AD 
Hits .64 (.13) .52 (.15) .56 (.10) 
Negative hits
 
.59 (.15) .40(.20) .35 (.19) 
Positive hits .69 (.14) .63 (.15) .76 (.12) 
FA
 
.31 (.15) .34 (.15) .45 (.10) 
Negative FA .24 (.15) .21 (.19) .25 (.16) 
Positive FA
 
.39 (.19) .48 (.16) .65 (.16) 
Note. Mean(standard deviation) overall performance (expressed as aproportion of total items) 
on the memory task for the three groups. See Results section3.2 for significant differences. 
FA = false alarms. 
3.3.Influence of adjective valence on the SRE in patients with aMCI and HC 
Analysis of accuracy scores revealed main effects of Group F(1,37) = 15.23, p < .001, 
η2p= .29, andCondition, F(2,74) = 19.41, p < .001, η
2
p= .34, but notof Valence, F(1,37) = 
2.70, p = .11, η2p= .07. There were no significant interactions between either Groupand 
Condition F(2,74) = 1,00, p = .38, η2p= .03, or Groupand Valence F(1,37) = .06, p = .80, η
2
p= 
.00, whereas the Condition x Valence interaction was significant,F(2,74) = 3.46, p < .05, η2p= 
.09. Finally, theinteraction between Group, Condition and Valence was significant,F(2,74) = 
3.22, p < .05, η2p= .09 (Fig.2).Posthoc analyses revealed a significant difference between HC 
and patients with aMCI on the self negative accuracy score. Patients with aMCIhad a lower 
self negative accuracy score than HC (p<. 02). All other between-group differences were 
nonsignificant (self positive accuracy, p = .25; other negative accuracy, p = .24; other positive 
accuracy, p = .42; semantic negative accuracy, p = .78;semantic positive accuracy, p = .22).  
For HC,theself negative accuracy scorewas higher than both the other negative 
accuracy score (p < .05) and the semantic negative accuracy score (p < .001). Theirself 
positive accuracy score was also higher than both their other positive accuracy score (p < .01) 
and their semantic positive accuracy score (p < .05). By contrast, the patients with aMCI had 
equivalent negative accuracy scores (self negative accuracy vs. other negative accuracy and 
self negative accuracy vs. semantic negative accuracy, p = .86 and p = .61, respectively). 
However, like HC, theirself positive accuracy scorewas higher than both the other positive 
accuracy score (p < .05) and the semantic positive accuracy score (p < .05). All other 
differences were nonsignificant. 
Hence, regardless of the controlcondition (other or semantic), HC exhibited an SRE 
for both negative and positive adjectives, whereasin the aMCI group, the SRE was only 
significant for positive adjectives. The absence of an SRE in patients with aMCI for negative 
adjectives seemed to be due to their less accurate recognition of self-referentially encoded 
negative adjectives compared with HC. 
 Fig. 2.Mean accuracy scores (proportion of hits minus proportion of false alarms) for 
negative and positive adjectives encoded with reference to the self or a distant other,or 
processed semantically,for HC and patients with aMCI. Error bars indicate standard errors of 
the mean (SEMs). * p< .05. **p< .01. ***p< .001.  
3.4.Identity valence inHC,patients with aMCIand mild AD, and its effect on the SRE 
inpatients with aMCI.  
The mean (± SD) identity valence z-scores were -.50 ± .87 for patients with aMCI and-
.46 ± .72 for patients with mild AD.The analyses revealed that patients with mild ADheld 
relativelypositive self-representations when compared with HC, t = 1.57, p = .18. However, 
patients with aMCIheld relatively negative self-representations when compared withHC, t = 
2.45, p < .05.It should be noted that the identity valence scores of two patients with aMCI and 
four patients with mildAD were missing, either because the patients refused to complete the 
questionnaire, or because they did not understand the instructions. 
Identity valence z-scores and self (positive/negative) accuracy scores of patients with 
aMCI were subjected to partial correlations with MADRS as a continued predictor.There was 
a significant positive correlation between negative identity valence z-scores and the self 
negative accuracy scores (r= .52, p < .05), but the correlation between positiveidentity 
valence z-scores and the self positive accuracy scores was not significant (r = .28, p = .26). 
3.5.Relationship between the SRE and dementia severity/depressivesymptoms in 
patients with aMCI. 
Supplemental correlation analyses between the two self accuracy scores 
(negative/positive) and the MMSE, MDRS andMADRS were carried out in patients with 
aMCIto investigate the effectsof cognitive deficit severityand depressive symptoms. No 
significant correlation was found. 
Therefore, neither cognitive deficits,nor depressive symptoms appeared to be linked to 
the loss of the SRE for negative adjectives and its preservation for positive adjectives in 
patients with aMCI. 
4.  DISCUSSION 
The main purpose of this study was to shed light on the mechanisms that may allowthe 
SRE on episodic memoryto persist across the early stages of AD pathology (aMCI probably 
due to AD and mild AD). Only one previous studyinvestigatingthis issue had includedpatients 
with aMCI, but the focus was not on the SRE per se (Rosa, Deason, Budson, & Gutchess, 
2015).Furthermore, thefew studies exploring this issue in patientswith AD had reported 
heterogeneous results: the SRE was either absent (Genon et al., 2014; Lalanne et al., 2013) or 
present and independent fromthe valence of the material used (Kalenzaga et al., 
2013).Additionally, the SRRE had been foundeither absent (Genon et al., 2014) or present, 
but inherent to the emotional aspects of the material used. In AD, Lalanneet al. (2013) 
foundthat the SRRE only appearedfor positive adjectives, while Kalenzaga and Clarys (2013) 
and Kalenzaga et al. (2013) only observed the SRRE for negative adjectives.In the present 
study, we investigated the influence of the valence of encoding material (adjectives) on the 
expression of the SRE in healthy older individuals,patients with aMCIand patients with mild 
AD. In addition, we looked at the extent to which the valence of our participants’ identity 
modulated the SRE.   
The memory task had recently been validated by our laboratory in a larger sample of 
healthy young individuals(Morel et al., 2014),and in the present study, we showed it to be 
appropriate and sensitive for the study of the SRE in both healthy older individuals and 
patients with aMCI. However, the memory task appeared too difficult for AD patients. This 
limitation will be discussed later. We showed that the SRE was present in healthy old 
individuals independently of material valence (positive or negative adjectives) and control 
condition (other or semantic). By contrast, in patients with aMCI, the SRE only manifested 
itself for positive adjectives, regardless of the control condition (other or semantic).The 
absence of an SRE for negative adjectives in these patients correlated with the degree to 
which they perceived themselves negatively.  
The beneficial effect of self-referential processing on episodic memory reported here 
for healthy older individuals corroborates results from previous studies inhealthy aging 
(Gutchess, Kensinger, & Schacter, 2010). The emotional independence of the SRE in healthy 
aging has also been reported elsewhere (Glisky & Marquine, 2009; Gutchess et al., 2007; 
Mueller et al., 1986), in particular when recognition is corrected by false alarms. As in the 
present study, both Gutchess et al. (2007) andGlisky and Marquine (2009) 
reportedsignificantly higher false alarm rates for positive distractors than for negative ones in 
healthy older participants. We observed thatthe amplitude of the SRE in our sample of healthy 
older individuals was not greater for positive stimuli than for negative ones. The positivity 
effect, defined as an age-related trend to attend to-and remember–stimuli that are positive 
rather than negative, has been well documented (see Reed & Carstensen, 2012, for a review). 
As people age, time horizons are increasingly perceived of as being constrained. According to 
the socioemotional selectivity theory (Carstensen, 2006), this change in the subjective sense 
of time left to live leads to a reorganization of the goal hierarchy, with the regulation of 
emotions becoming a priority. Immediate emotional gratification and wellbeing become more 
important than other type of goals involving delayed rewards. 
aMCI patients from the present study showed a SRE which magnitudewas similar to 
that of our healthy old participants when the adjectives were positive, but this effect 
disappeared when the adjectives were negative. Interestingly, a quite important proportion of 
patients with mild AD showed this pattern, as revealed by complementary analyses we made 
on individual’s profile. As expected, the overall memory performance of the patients with 
aMCI was lower than that of healthy old participants, indicating that the SRE for positive 
adjectives was not strong enough to counteract their memory impairments. All in all, these 
patients demonstrated a positivity effect for total hits, as well as a positivity bias for false 
alarms. Because the SRE persisted among the patients with aMCI for positive adjectives, it 
can be argued that these patients benefited from a positivity effect for self-referred 
information. This result was neither related to dementia severity, nor to depressive symptoms, 
even though the patients with aMCI were more impaired on these cognitive aspects than 
healthy old participants. Moreover,aMCI patients rated their identity relatively more 
negativelythan healthy old participants, a result that we did not expect, since it had been 
reported in previous studies that AD patients exhibited a relatively positive sense of identity 
when compared with healthy old individuals (Eustache et al., 2013; Kalenzaga & Clarys, 
2013; Lalanne et al., 2013). This could be attributed to the fact that some AD patients from 
the present study were anosognosic, as recently reported by our laboratory(Perrotin et al., 
2015). In particular, Perrotin et al. (2015) have demonstrated that the lack of awareness of 
memory disorders in these AD patients was due to disconnection between and within self-
related and memory-related brain networks.Contrary to AD patients from the present 
study,patients with aMCI were more aware of their cognitive deficits, which may have had an 
impact on the way they perceived themselves (i.e., more negatively than patients with mild 
AD). We said above that the absence of an SRE for negative adjectives wasrelated to the 
extent to which some patients held a generally negative view of themselves. Indeed, the loss 
of an SRE for negative adjectives stemmed not from ageneral decline in the recognition of 
these adjectives, but from a specific decrease in the recognition of negative adjectives 
processed with reference to the self. In addition, recognition performancefor negative 
adjectives processed with reference to the selfmatchedthose of negative adjectives encoded 
with reference to another person or processed semantically. Several hypotheses can thus be 
formulated: either negative adjectives were not processed self-referentially at the time of 
encoding, or if they were, they did not undergo the appropriate depth of processing. Another 
hypothesis is that, at the time of recognition, negative adjectives that had previously been self-
referred were ignored. 
According to Conway’s self-memory system(Conway, 2005), the working self and the 
autobiographical memory knowledge base lie at the root of the relationship between self and 
memory. The working self is an executive identity driven by goals. It allows for the encoding 
of information in accordance with the individual’s goals, while at the same time maintaining a 
coherent representation of the interactions between the self and its environment, thus 
providing a continuous feeling of identity. The working self may control the encoding and 
retrieval of information in and from the autobiographical knowledge base. It thus fulfils two 
functions: executive (goal-directed) and conceptual (subjective self-representation).In studies 
using self-reference paradigms where a free-recall task was administered instead of a 
recognition task, healthy individuals exhibited a positivity effect for self-referential 
information (Kuiper & Derry, 1982; Sanz, 1996;Sedikides & Green, 2000). However, in a 
free-recalltask, participants are providedwithfewerretrievalcuesthantheywouldbe in a 
recognition task, wherecues are providedalongwithlures. As such, in a free-recall task, 
participants need more to elaborate their own retrieval cues, in order to gain access tostored 
information (Koutstaal&Schacter, 1997). D’Argembeau, Comblain, and Van der Linden 
(2005) investigated whether this positivity effect for self-referential information depends on 
retrieval conditions, by comparing the memory performances of healthy individuals on free-
recall versus recognition tasks. They observed a positivity effect for self-referential adjectives 
in the free-recall task, but no effect of valence for self-referential adjectives in the recognition 
task. The authors concluded that the positivity effect observed in the free-recall task probably 
emerged because of the control over access to stored information exerted by the working 
self,with the latter shaping appropriate retrieval cues for accessing memories relevant to the 
individuals’ current goals. By contrast, in the recognition task (like the one in the present 
study), where individuals hadless need to elaborate retrieval cues, the working self had less 
control over access to stored information.Kalenzaga and Clarys (2013) also explored the 
impairment of both components of the working self (i.e., executive and conceptual) in patients 
with AD. They demonstrated that although these patients rated their personality as positively 
as healthy older individuals did, they exhibited a negativity effect for self-referential 
adjectives. The authors therefore hypothesized that self-related information may be processed 
differentially, depending on the level of consciousness required by the task. They postulated 
that explicitly self-related information (e.g., in self-rating questionnaires) is processed in a 
controlled way, whereas implicitly self-related information (e.g., in self-reference encoding) 
is processed in an automatic way. This hypothesis is in line with D’Argembeau et al. (2005)’s 
results set out above.Unlike the patients with AD in Kalenzaga and Clarys (2013)’s study, our 
patients with aMCI had a relatively negative explicit view of themselves, but exhibited a 
positivity effect for self-referential adjectives that were supposedly processed automatically. 
Here, we suggest that this process may actually have beencontrolled, rather than automatic. 
Even though the patients with aMCI were performing a recognition task, their working 
selvesmay have had an opportunity to exert their control over which information should be 
encoded and retrieved, and which should be omitted. This controlled processing of 
information may serve as a defense mechanism in the presence of potential threats to the 
preservation of the self. AD patients fromKalenzaga and Clarys (2013) study lived in a 
nursing home. The authors indeed reported that AD patients informants (caregivers from the 
nursing home) were prone to rate the patients’ personalities and autonomy more negatively 
than that of healthy older individuals institutionalized in the same nursing home. By contrast, 
aMCI patients from our study were, by definition and in facts, autonomous, living in the 
dwelling community and engaged in healthy social activities. Because a loss of self is often 
linked to the disease (Herskovits, 1995), AD usually conveys fear among the general 
population. Many studies have shown that social interactions influence the way that patients 
with AD experience their selves (Harman & Clare, 2006; Katsuno, 2005;Kitwood & Bredin, 
1992; Langdon, Eagle, & Warner, 2007). In AD, detrimental interpersonal relationships with 
others have been shown to be a potential threat for the self, while healthy social interactions 
have been shown to be beneficial for the integrity and maintenance of a sense of self, as well 
as for self-esteem (Sabat & Harré, 1992; Sørensen, Waldorff, & Waldemar, 2008).  
Three studies had previously used a memory task similar to ours to investigate the 
SRE in AD. Only in Genon et al. (2014)’s study had the task been administered-as it was in 
the present study-to healthy older individuals and patients with AD inside a 3T MRI scanner. 
The patients with AD in Genon et al. (2014)’s study were at the same, early-mid stage of 
dementia as ours. Encoding was also incidental, and the SRE was calculated in the same way 
as in the present study. However, there was only one control condition (other), and the effect 
of material valence was not investigated. The authors reported an SRE in the group of healthy 
older individuals, corroborating our results. In addition, they failed to find an SRE in the AD 
group. Patients’ recognition performance for adjectives encoded with reference either to self 
or to other weregenerally lower than those of healthy older individuals, but there was no floor 
effect. Moreover, the percentage of correct rejections of new items (which inversely reflects 
false alarms) was relatively high in the AD group (77.6 ± 12.6), albeit statistically below that 
of the group of healthy older individuals (89.2 ± 5.9). There are severalmethodological 
reasons why the SRE could be investigated in the patients with AD in Genon et al. (2014)’s 
study. First of all, the patient sample was larger than ours (21 vs. 10), which may have 
contributed to better data collection and statistical robustness. Second, unlike our sample of 
patients who were not receiving any treatment, twelve patients were receiving an 
anticholinesterase inhibitor and five patients were taking Ginkgo biloba during the 
experiment. Those two treatments are known to potentially decrease or decelerate memory 
loss in AD (Diamond & Bailey, 2013; Song et al., 2014). We cannot totally exclude the 
possibility that this variable contributed to the fairly good overall recognition performance of 
the patients with AD in Genon et al. (2014)’s study. Third and last, the memory task was 
administered in a different way. The patients with AD in Genon et al. (2014)’s study 
underwent more intensive pre-experimental training. In addition, the encoding session was 
intentional (participants knew a recognition session would follow). Once again, these two 
variables may have promoted deeper encoding, leading to better–and usable-recognition 
performance data (Craik & Lockhart, 1972). Like us, Lalanneet al. (2013) used a memory task 
in which encoding was incidental, although there was only one control condition (semantic). 
They applied Cohen’s dto calculate the memory performances of healthy older individuals 
and patients with AD.As in the present study, they found an SRE in healthy olderparticipants 
that was independent of material valence.As indicated above, they failed to find an SRE in the 
AD group. Cohen’s d is an effect size, usually used in meta-analyses, and it reflects the 
difference between two means divided by the standard deviation of the data. The higher its 
value, the larger the effect size. With this method of calculation,Lalanne et al. (2013) reported 
that healthy older participants displayed dramaticallybetter recognition performances than the 
patients with AD, in bothsemantic and self conditions. This observation raises the question of 
whether the SRE could actually be investigated in the AD group, asthe patients’ memory 
performancesin each condition were so low that they leftthe data open to misinterpretation. It 
should be noted that the patients with AD in Lalanne et al. (2013)’s study were at the same 
mild stage of dementia as the patients in the present study. Finally, Kalenzaga et al. (2013) 
applied an intentional memory task with a self-reference and a semantic condition to patients 
with AD who were at a more pronounced stage of dementia than the patients in the present 
study. Both groups (patients and healthy older individuals) were recruited from nursing 
homes. The patients were able to perform the memory task despite the severity of their 
disease. The study reported an overall decline in recognition performances among patients, 
compared with control participants. However, the patients with AD benefited just as much 
from the SRE as the healthy older participants, regardless of the valence of the material 
(positive or negative adjectives). These conflicting results may once again stem from a 
methodological issue, asKalenzaga et al. (2013) did notcorrect recognition performances for 
false alarms. As demonstrated in many studies(including the present one), the omission of 
false alarms in the estimation of recognition performance can lead to a misinterpretation of 
the data. 
Up to now, the effect of material valence on the expression of the SRRE in AD has 
only been investigated and reported in three studies. Looking at the effect of self-reference 
through the R/K paradigm is another, more concise, way of estimating the SRRE on episodic 
memory performance, as the R/K paradigm makes it possible to distinguish between correct 
responses according to the underlying memory process (episodic/semantic). In patients with 
AD, the SRRE has variously been shown to be salient for negative (Kalenzaga&Clarys, 2013, 
Kalenzaga et al., 2013) and for positive (Lalanne et al., 2013) adjectives. Once again, these 
conflicting results may stem from differences in methodological approach: the patients in 
Kalenzaga and Clarys (2013) and Kalenzaga et al. (2013)’s studies were at a more 
pronounced stage of the disease, and were institutionalized in nursing homes, whereas those 
in Lalanne et al. (2013)’s study were not.  
One limitation to this study was the setting of the memory task.We are aware that the 
MRI scanner could have been a stressful environment for patients withmild AD and 
haveconstituteda major obstacle to collect data in this group. However, some patients with 
mild AD already had troubles to perform the pre-experimental, training session, outside the 
scanner.A second limitation was the overall difficulty of the self-reference task for the 
patientswith mild AD. Another one, directly related to this first limitation, was the small 
sample size of AD patients that could be investigated, which probably reduced the robustness 
of our statistical analysis. Ten of the 20 patients initially recruited in the study had to be 
excluded because they could not understand the instructions of the memory task. However, as 
shown in Table 1, the sample of AD patients excluded presented a neuropsychological profile 
similarto the one included. For instance, both sample were at the mild stage of Alzheimer’s 
disease with regard to their mean MMSE score (between the range of 19 to 24;Feldman & 
Woodward, 2005). However, their cognitive impairments were quantitatively more 
pronounced, even though these observations were not statistically significant. Thus, 
precautions must be taken, probably at the time of the neuropsychological screening and 
before any inclusion in a study, whenattempting to study complex memory processes in AD 
patients.We hope these results will serve future investigations on the SRE in AD, by saving 
time and possible inconvenience for the investigators, and above all, for the patients.  
Finally, with regard to the sample of patients with mild ADwho performed the self-
referential memory task, we were able to observe that they rated their personality just as 
positively as patients with aMCI and healthy older individuals. This result corroborates the 
findings of previous studies showing that patients with AD tend to rate their personality as 
positively as healthy older individuals do (Kalenzaga&Clarys, 2013; Lalanne et al., 2013), 
even when they are in the more severe stages of the disease (Eustache et al., 2013).Moreover, 
the patients with mild AD performed the task appropriately, as revealed by the rates of total 
responses and mean response latencies during encoding and recognition. They recognized 
significantly more positive adjectives than negative ones overall and produced more false 
alarms for positive adjectives than healthy older individuals.Interestingly, complementary 
analyses revealed that a quite important proportion of AD patients displayed a SRE for 
positive adjectives. Because patients with mild AD have severe episodic memory 
impairments, their attention bias toward positive information probably failed to counteract 
their memory deficits. The positivity effect observed in aging may therefore persist, but be 
altered in AD patients. However, we cannot exclude the possibility that these observations 
could be an epiphenomenon of a small sample. Of note, nonparametric analyses yielded 
similar results. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
To conclude,we investigated and reported for the first time a SRE for positive 
personality trait adjectives in patients with aMCI. The finding that patients with aMCI who 
heldnegative self-representations systematically failed to recognize negative self-
referentialadjectives,but successfully recognized the positive ones,points to a controlled 
processing of informationaimed at regulating emotions and wellbeing. This controlled 
processing of information may reflect some sort of self-defense, or mnenic neglect, as 
suggested by Sedikides and Green (2000, 2004).Theirmnenic neglect modelstates that 
feedback that is negative for central self-aspectsisself-threatening. It triggersa self-defense 
mechanism wherebynegative information related to the self is poorly recalled, compared with 
negative information related to another person (Sedikides & Green, 2000, 2004). Most 
importantly, with regard to anosognosiathat is sometimes encountered in AD, it appears to be 
information negativity, rather than information inconsistency (with the self), that 
drivesmnenic neglect.Sedikides and Green (2004) had shown that healthy participants holding 
negative self-representations recalled positive feedback better than negative ones, which is the 
pattern we observed during recognition in our sample of aMCI patients. It seems as if threat to 
the self would build over other factorsfor maintaining a positive self-esteem via positive self-
related memories. 
More investigations are needed to pinpoint the exact moment at which mnenic neglect 
may occur. Either self-negative information is allocated fewer resources and processed more 
shallowly than self-positive information during encoding, self-negative information is blocked 
at retrieval, or both.Finally, if mnenic neglect sometime fails to operate in patients with AD 
(Kalenzaga&Clarys, 2013;Kalenzaga et al., 2013),it may be because of the negative, 
institutionalized setting in which some of themlive, and the negative feedback they receive 
from it. It is therefore of the utmost importance tofocus on patients’ psychosocial, affective 
dimension, as it may constitute an important factor forthe preservation of the self-and 
memory-in AD pathology. 
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Figure captions  
Fig. 1. Illustration of the memory task. The incidental encoding phase was divided into 
two parts, each lasting roughly 7 minutes, during which participants had to determine whether 
the adjective displayed described them (self-referential condition) or a celebrity (other-
referential condition), or whether it was a positive adjective or not(semantic condition). 
Adjectives were displayed on a screen one at a time for 3500 ms, followed by a fixation cross 
for 1000-3000 ms. Participants answered “Yes” or “No” with their right and left index fingers 
(counterbalanced across participants) using keypads. They were reminded of which side 
corresponded to which answerat the bottom of the screen. The recognition phasecame 
immediately after the incidental encoding session. Previously encountered adjectives (old 
ones) were mixed with distractors (new ones). Presentation of the adjectives was similar to 
that of the previous session (adjectives were presented on a screen one at a time for 3500 ms). 
Participants had to decide whether or not they had already seen each adjective during the 
incidental encoding session. 
Fig. 2.Mean accuracy scores (proportion of hits minus proportion of false alarms) for 
negative and positive adjectives encoded with reference to the self or a distant other,or 
processed semantically,for HC and patients with aMCI. Error bars indicate standard errors of 
the mean (SEMs). * p< .05. ** p< .01. ***p< .001. 
